Directed Energy Weapons Are Real . . . And Disruptive

PRISM 8, NO. 3 FEATURES | 37

Directed Energy Weapons

Are Real . . . And Disruptive

By Henry “Trey” Obering, III

n the 1951 science fiction film, “The Day the Earth Stood Still,” powerful ray guns are shown vaporizing

rifles and even tanks. In the Star Wars movies, a wide variety of directed energy weapons are depicted,

from handheld light sabers to massive, spaceship-mounted laser cannons.

What exactly is a directed energy weapon? Are these weapons still science fiction, lab experiments, or are

they real? How can they be used and how disruptive can they be? What are the challenges and next steps? This

article will examine answers to these questions.

What are Directed Energy Weapons?

According to DOD’s Joint Publication 3–13 Electronic Warfare, directed energy (DE) is described as an;

umbrella term covering technologies that produce a beam of concentrated electromagnetic energy

or atomic or subatomic particles. A DE weapon is a system using DE primarily as a direct means to

disable, damage or destroy adversary equipment, facilities, and personnel. DE warfare is military

action involving the use of DE weapons, devices, and countermeasures to either cause direct damage or

destruction of adversary equipment, facilities, and personnel, or to determine, exploit, reduce, or pre-

vent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) through damage, destruction, and disruption.

DE weapons include high-energy lasers, high-power radio frequency or microwave devices, and charged

or neutral particle beam weapons.

Microwaves and lasers are both part of the electromagnetic spectrum,

which includes light energy and radio waves. The distinction between them is the wavelength/frequency of

the energy. While they are both part of the electromagnetic spectrum, laser and microwave weapons operate

very differently and have very different effects.

Think of the difference between a laser pointer and a flashlight. The laser light is coherent in a single

color, and the flashlight is broad-spectrum light. Because of its coherence, laser light can stay concentrated for

very long distances—even thousands of miles into space. But with laser weapons, instead of thinking in terms

Lieutenant General Henry “Trey” Obering, III, USAF (ret.), is an Executive Vice President and Directed Energy Lead at Booz

Allen Hamilton and the former director of the Missile Defense Agency.

38 | FEATURES PRISM 8, NO. 3

OBERING

of a laser pointer, the mental image should be more

like a powerful, long-range blowtorch!

Lasers can be categorized as gas, solid state,

or a hybrid of the two. The lasers on the current

path to weaponization include solid state combined

fiber and crystal slab as well as hybrid lasers. Fiber

lasers are lasers in which the active medium being

used is an optical fiber that has been doped in rare

elements, most often Erbium.

Slab lasers represent

one class of high-power solid-state lasers in which

the laser crystal has the form of a slab.

Hybrid lasers

such as a diode pumped alkali laser use a combina-

tion of trace gas with semiconductor diode arrays for

even higher power and efficiency.

The destructive power of directed energy weap-

ons (their lethality) derives from the amount of energy

transferred to the target over time. This concentrated

energy can have effects across the entire spectrum

from non-lethal to lethal. For example, lasers can cut

through steel, aluminum, and many other materials

in a matter of seconds. They can be very effective in

causing pressurized vessels to explode such as missile

propellant and oxidizer tanks. They can destroy,

degrade or blind many other systems that contain sen-

sors and electronics. For high energy lasers, lethality

depends on the power output of the laser, the purity

and concentration of the light (beam quality), the

target range, the ability to keep the laser on the target

aimpoint (jitter control and tracking), and the atmo-

spheric environment the laser traverses to the target.

In this last factor, the frequency of the laser and the

engagement altitude will have a significant impact on

how much the atmosphere effects the laser’s lethality.

Laser energy can be generated as a continuous wave

or in pulses, which also influences its lethality. High-

energy lasers (HEL) can range from a few kilowatts to

megawatts of average power.

High-power microwave (HPM) and high-power

millimeter wave weapons emit beams of electro-

magnetic energy typically from about 10 megahertz

to the 100 gigahertz frequency range. Like lasers,

HPM weapons can operate in a pulsed or contin-

uous manner and are classified using “peak” or

“average” power respectively. Most HPM systems are

based on short pulses of radiofrequency (RF) energy,

for which peak power is the important metric. The

antenna gain of the weapon system is also very

important, and when combined with the power of

the RF source, yields the Effective Radiated Power

(ERP) of the weapon. Depending on the particulars

of the weapon, and how it is used, ERP levels can

reach into the hundreds of gigawatts or higher. For

continuous wave systems, which use high average

power to effect targets, levels are typically from 50 to

100s of kilowatts up to several megawatts of power.

The power levels are driven by prime power gener-

ation limitations, and ERP’s depend on the antenna

design and aperture (i.e., size).

Almost everyone has probably experienced the

“lethality” of a microwave device when they inad-

vertently put a metal object into a kitchen microwave

oven and watched the “sparks fly.” This same energy

can be applied at higher powers for weapon effects.

There are numerous pathways and entry points

through which microwave energy can penetrate

electronic systems. If the microwave energy travels

through the target’s own antenna, dome, or other

sensor opening, then this pathway is commonly

referred to as the “front door.”

On the other hand,

if the microwave emissions travel through cracks,

seams, trailing wires, metal conduits, or seals of the

target, then this pathway is called the “back door.”

In the weapons version, the microwave energy

effects or lethality depends on the power and range

to target, but the energy beams tend to be larger

and not as sensitive to jitter as is the case for the

high energy lasers. HPM lethality can be affected by

atmospheric conditions as well, but to a much lesser

degree than high-energy laser (HEL) weapons. HPM

weapons lethality is typically described in terms of

their ability to deny, degrade, damage or destroy a

target’s capabilities.

PRISM 8, NO. 3 FEATURES | 39

DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS

The term “deny” is defined as the ability to

eliminate the enemy’s ability to operate with-

out inflicting harm on the system. A microwave

weapon can achieve this result by causing malfunc-

tions within certain relay and processing circuits

within the enemy target system. For example, the

static and distortion that high voltage power lines

have on a car radio causes no lasting damage to the

radio after the car leaves the area. Thus, the “deny”

capability is not permanent because the affected

systems can be easily restored to their previous

operational condition.

The meaning of “degrade” is to remove the

enemy’s ability to operate and to potentially inflict

minimal injury on electronic hardware systems.

Examples of this capability include signal overrides

or insertion, power cycling (turning power on and

off at irregular intervals) and causing the system to

“lock-up.” These effects are not permanent because

the target system will return to normal operation

within a specified time, which obviously varies

according to the weapon. In most cases, the target

system must be shut off and restarted, and may

require minor repairs before it can operate nor-

mally again.

The idea of “damage” is to inflict moderate

injury on enemy communications facilities, weapons

systems, and subsystems hardware, and to do so in

order to incapacitate the enemy for a certain time.

Examples include damaging individual components,

circuit cards, or the “mother boards” in a desktop

computer. This damage may create permanent

effects depending upon the severity of the attack

and the ability of the enemy to diagnose, replace, or

repair the affected systems.

Finally, the concept of “destroy” involves the

ability to inflict catastrophic and permanent injury

on the enemy functions and systems. In this case,

the enemy would be required to totally replace entire

systems, facilities, and hardware if it was to regain

any degree of operational status.

In addition to being able to scale effects on a tar-

get, directed energy weapons have inherent attributes

that are attractive to the warfighter. These include:

 speed of light engagement which makes respon-

siveness and tracking much faster than kinetic

weapons;

 deep shot magazines which are only limited by

the electrical power supplied to and re-gener-

ated by the system;

 “stealth-like” performance (quiet and invisible

beams) that are hard to detect or intercept;

 precision targeting for both lethal and non-le-

thal applications; and

 low-cost per shot compared to traditional

munitions.

Directed energy weapons have been in

development for decades in our nation’s research

and development organizations, national labo-

ratories and industry. So how close are they to

becoming weaponized?

Are Directed Energy Weapons Still

Science Fiction, Lab Experiments or

Ready for the Warfighters?

In early versions of laser weapons, the light

was generated by chemical reactions. Between

2000–05, a prototype chemical laser successfully

destroyed 46 rockets, artillery shells and mortar

rounds in flight during field tests. However, these

lasers were generally large and heavy. In fact, the

megawatt-class Airborne Laser developed in the

late 1990s and early 2000s required an entire 747

aircraft to hold the equipment. Each of the six

laser modules were as large as small cars and the

chemical storage tanks, optical benches, con-

trol equipment and piping packed the aircraft. In

2010, the Airborne Laser shot down two missiles

(both solid and liquid propelled) in their boost

phase during flight testing which demonstrated

40 | FEATURES PRISM 8, NO. 3

OBERING

the lethality of the laser against missile targets. We

proved that the technology could be effective, but

its size, weight, and power (SWaP) requirements

made the laser weapons impracticable to field.

Today, solid state electrical (including fiber)

and hybrid lasers are being developed that are much

lighter and smaller. The combination of technology

advancements improving lethality and reducing

SWaP in high energy laser technology and the advent

of threats such as hypersonic weapons for which

kinetic solutions are problematic has resulted in high

energy lasers and directed energy weapons more gen-

erally being pursued vigorously across the services

consistent with the National Defense Strategy.

In recent years the U.S. Navy deployed a 30kW

class solid state laser weapon system (LaWS) pro-

totype on the Afloat Forward Staging Base, USS

Ponce. It was capable of damaging or destroying fast

attack boats, unmanned aerial vehicles and was used

for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

(ISR). When the LaWS was being integrated onto the

ship, the designers and developers envisioned that it

would be used several hours a day. It turned out that

during its three-year deployment, from 2011–14, it

was used nearly around the clock in its ISR mode.

Because of the strategic imperative to protect

U.S. carrier battlegroups to enable us to project

power, the U.S. Navy is following this prototyping

effort with a much broader “Navy Laser Family of

Systems” or NLFoS program, which will put the

Navy on a path to develop and deploy lasers ranging

from low power laser “dazzlers” to much higher

power lasers capable of destroying anti-ship and

high-speed cruise missiles. Examples of NLFoS

weapons include: a 60kW laser called HELIOS (High

Energy Laser with Integrated Optical-dazzler and

Surveillance) expected to be deployed by 2021 that

will be capable of burning through small boats and

shooting down drones; the SSL–TM (Solid State

Laser–Technology Maturation system), which will

eventually be a 150kW laser weapon on the LPD–27

amphibious ship; and the ODIN (Optical Dazzling

Interdictor, Navy) that will also go on a destroyer.

The U.S. Army has also been moving out

aggressively in developing and deploying directed

energy weapons as part of its Air and Missile

Defense modernization priority. Within that pri-

ority area, the Army is focused on the use of high

energy lasers to provide Indirect Fire Protection

Capability (IFPC) and Maneuver—Short-Range

Air Defense (M-SHORAD). The Army’s Rapid

Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office is

now asked to make DE technology available to the

warfighters as quickly as possible. Building on the

Army’s DE efforts during the past 5 to 7 years, the

Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office

(RCCTO) is committed to fielding 50kW lasers on

four Strykers (eight wheeled armored fighting vehi-

cles), delivering a residual combat capability at the

Platoon level as part of the M-SHORAD mission in

support of a Brigade Combat Team.

Building a Stryker with a 50kW laser is a

follow-on to the 5kW laser the Army tested on

the vehicle just a year ago in Germany at the Joint

Warfighting Assessment and related efforts.

DefenseNews in their coverage of the March 2018

Booz Allen Hamilton/CSBA Directed Energy

Summit in Washington highlighted the remark

by Colonel Dennis Wille, the Army G3 strategic

program chief for U.S. Army Europe, that over the

weekend the 2

Stryker Cavalry Regiment (sup-

ported by the 7

Army Training Command and the

Fires Center of Excellence at Fort Sill, Oklahoma)

had conducted a live-fire engagement of the 5kW

Mobile Expeditionary High-Energy Laser demon-

strator at the Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany.

This is just the beginning of a plan to deploy 50kW

lasers on four of its Stryker vehicles over the next few

years for operational use.

A fire support noncommissioned officer with

Division Artillery, 4

Infantry Division, who par-

ticipated in the testing of a 2kW version of the laser

PRISM 8, NO. 3 FEATURES | 41

DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS

vehicle at Fort Sill, Oklahoma against unmanned

drones was quoted in a February 28, 2018 Army

Times article as saying, “It was extremely efficient,

I was able to bring them down as [fast as] they were

able to put them up.”

The Army used Navy-, and Air Force- devel-

oped HPM weapons during recent conflicts to

counter improvised explosive devices (IEDs). These

devices have also been demonstrated to stall or

damage car, truck, or boat motors. This capability

would be very useful at checkpoints or for stopping

escaping vehicles.

In 2017, the Air Force Secretary and Chief of

Staff signed the DE Flight Plan outlining the path

ahead for the Air Force to develop and deploy both

high-energy lasers and high-power RF weapons

for its aircraft. This plan includes a program which

aims to test high energy lasers on aircraft against

surface to air and air to air missile threats. Similar

to the Army’s RCCTO and the Navy’s Accelerated

Acquisition (AA) Process, the Air Force is leveraging

both Air Force Research Laboratory’s DE Directorate

and Air Force Strategic Development Planning and

Experimentation Office to expedite delivery of capa-

bilities to address key capability gaps identified in

the DE flight plan: Forward Base Defense, Precision

Strike, and Aircraft Self-Protect. In addition, the Air

Force has partnered with the Navy in the develop-

ment of a high-power RF weapon called High-power

Joint Electromagnetic Non-Kinetic Strike (HiJENKS)

capable of attacking electronics, communications

and computer networks.

The Air Force also recently demonstrated the

ability of an HPM weapon to bring down multiple

drones in testing at White Sands Missile Range in New

Mexico, according to a recent Military.com article:

“After decades of research and investment,

we believe these advanced directed-en-

ergy applications will soon be ready for the

battlefield to help protect people, assets and

infrastructure.” Thomas Bussing, Raytheon

Advanced Missile Systems vice president,

said in a news release accompanying the

announcement. The release noted the HPM

and HEL systems engaged and defeated

“dozens of unmanned aerial system targets”

during the exercise.

But by far, the most ambitious program

underway in DOD is being led by the Missile

Defense Agency (MDA). It is developing a very

high-power laser capable of being eventually

deployed on a space-based platform to target mis-

siles during their boost/ascent/midcourse phase.

This laser would be megawatt class and have a

range of hundreds of miles.

The first step in this endeavor is underway

with funding for laser scaling and beam quality

improvements for both combined fiber lasers as

well as hybrid lasers such as the diode pumped

alkali laser or DPALS. These lasers, combined with

significant improvements in computational power,

represent dramatic advances in technology over

those used in the Airborne Laser program. The

The High Energy Laser Mobile Demonstrator,

or HEL MD, is the result of U.S. Army Space

and Missile Defense Command research.

(Army photo)

42 | FEATURES PRISM 8, NO. 3

OBERING

laser diodes, fiber amplifiers, battery and power

management, thermal control, and optical systems

are also much more advanced.

The United States will soon be reaching the

point where it can generate a megawatt of power in

a size, weight, and volume capable of being put on

a high-altitude aircraft or space-based platform. As

DOD works to develop and incorporate these tech-

nologies, much of the work should be collaborative,

such as improvements in materials, power gener-

ation, thermal control, etc. to reduce size, weight,

and power required to operate these weapons.

However, the wide variety of missions, platforms,

and implementation environments necessitates con-

tinued service-differentiated development activities.

This also includes fundamental differences such as

the wavelength of the lasers and the beam quality

required for success.

For example, a Navy ship-to-air laser will have

different requirements than an Air Force air-to-air

system, which will have different requirements than

a space-based missile defense system and therefore

different technological considerations. Discrete,

mission-aligned efforts will maintain our pace of

development in the race to get these technologies to

the field.

How Can They Be Used and How

Disruptive Can They Be?

Some applications of directed energy weapons to

solve today’s challenges have already been described,

such as stopping swarms of small adversary boats

which have been harassing U.S. ships in inter-

national waters, or stopping vehicles carrying

improvised explosive devices at a safe distance

from U.S. personnel. As another example, high

energy lasers could be used to protect forward-de-

ployed troops and bases from attacks by swarms of

unmanned aircraft carrying explosive devices.

But let us broaden these applications somewhat.

In addition to the nuclear ballistic missile threat posed

by North Korea, which can be defended by U.S. mis-

sile defense systems, there is a North Korean threat

which cannot be defended against today . . . the 14,000

artillery and rocket launchers arrayed within strik-

ing distance of Seoul with its 10 million inhabitants.

Imagine how much the geopolitical calculus would

change on the peninsula if a layered, integrated sys-

tem of high energy lasers and high-power microwave

weapons was deployed to defend against these threats.

Turning to the air, the United States spent

billions of dollars to develop and deploy stealth

technology for its fighters and bombers to avoid

radar detection and being targeted by surface to

air missiles. What if the United States could deploy

effective anti-missile lasers on its’ aircraft to defeat

any missile(s) fired at them? In effect, the United

States would have provided “stealth-like” capability

to entire fleets of aircraft.

In a much more dramatic application, the

recently released Missile Defense Review (MDR),

the first update to U.S. Missile Defense Strategy in

nearly a decade, delivers a visionary plan to protect

the United States from ever-intensifying threats

around the world. For example, the MDR proposes

that the Missile Defense Agency study the potential

to develop and field space-based lasers to intercept

ballistic missiles.

Space-based lasers would have a profound

impact on the U.S. ability to defend and if neces-

sary, fight in space. Not only could they be used to

defend against ballistic missiles in the boost/ascent

and midcourse phase, but they could also be used

to defend critical space-based assets against enemy

anti-satellite attack.

Directed energy weapons could also play a key

role in defending against what has been described

as the number one threat to the United States by

the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and

Engineering Dr. Mike Griffin—hypersonic weapons.

He has pressed for the development of hypersonic

weapons by the United States as well as a defense

PRISM 8, NO. 3 FEATURES | 43

DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS

against them. In a March 6, 2018 speech, said, “I’m

sorry for everybody out there who champions some

other high priority, some technical thing; it’s not that

I disagree with those,” he told the room, “But there

has to be a first, and hypersonics is my first.”

There are two types of hypersonic weapons,

boost glide and air-launched high-speed cruise

missiles. Boost glide weapons are launched atop

ballistic missiles then released to glide to the target.

The air-launched uses scramjets or rockets to power

it throughout flight. These high-speed missiles

fly at Mach 5 (five times the speed of sound) and

greater. They can not only achieve these speeds but

can maneuver at them as well including varying

trajectories, headings and altitudes. Therefore,

currently deployed defenses against ballistic mis-

siles will not be effective in defending against these

non-ballistic threats. There is no “silver bullet”

defense against these weapons and in fact there will

have to be an architectural approach in defending

against them, but directed energy weapons can

potentially play a major role.

Since these weapons maneuver, the United

States needs to be able to precisely track the hyper-

sonic missile throughout its entire flight or “birth

to death.” The only cost-effective way to accomplish

this is using space-based satellites. Developing hyper-

sonic interceptors will also be an option in the U.S.

defense architecture. But there is a rule of thumb that

states that an interceptor needs to be capable of three

times the speed of the target it is defending against

to be able to maneuver to destroy it. So hypersonic

kinetic interceptors would have to be capable of

achieving speeds of Mach 15 and higher.

One of the greatest attributes of directed energy

weapons is that they operate at the speed of light. So,

for a hypersonic weapon that is travelling at 25 times

the speed of sound, a high- energy laser can engage

it at roughly 35,000 times its speed. This makes tar-

geting and tracking easier as well. Space-based high

energy lasers could be brought to bear especially

in the boost/ascent phase of boost glide hypersonic

missiles where a high-energy laser could destroy the

vehicle early in its trajectory. At the speeds that these

hypersonic missiles fly, they have vulnerabilities

which could be exploited by directed energy weap-

ons. Therefore, HELs and HPMs could also play a

role in the midcourse/terminal phase of both types

of hypersonic missile flight.

Directed energy weapons are no longer just sci-

ence fiction. They are real and are maturing rapidly.

In the next several years, the U.S. Army, Navy and

Air Force all plan to develop and field these weapons

at an increasing pace. They will be deployed on land

vehicles, aircraft, helicopters, and ships.

Even the most conservative market projections

for directed energy weapons indicate nearly $30

billion being spent by the United States during the

next ten years. They are not the answer to all the

challenges, and will not replace kinetic weapons, but

they are an essential adjunct to countering specific

threats and providing dominance in land, air, sea,

and space. The United States has the technology,

the resources, the talent, and the infrastructure to

develop and deploy directed energy weapons to meet

today’s and tomorrow’s emerging threats.

The only question is whether the United States

and its allies will achieve that dominance before an

adversary does.

What Are the Challenges and Next

Steps?

The United States has come a very long way in the

development of directed energy weapon capabilities

and is now at a critical juncture. The technology

is maturing rapidly, threats are emerging which

directed energy can almost uniquely address, and

the warfighters are signaling their support.

However, as with the development of any

unprecedented military capability, there are risks,

challenges and limitations involving their cost,

schedule and performance. In the case of directed

44 | FEATURES PRISM 8, NO. 3

OBERING

energy weapons, there has been significant risk

reduction which has been accomplished over

several decades. Examples of this cited earlier

included the Airborne Laser, the Navy’s LaWS

program, and others. However, risks, challenges

and limitations remain.

For example, atmospheric conditions such as

turbulence, haze, clouds, etc. can affect a laser’s

performance but there are ways to address these

phenomena. First, the choice of a laser’s wavelength

can help to mitigate the affect because different laser

wavelengths perform much better in the atmosphere

than others. And of course, lasers employed at

higher altitudes or in space would have very little to

no atmospheric affects.

In addition, a technique known as “adaptive

optics” has been developed for many years. In this

case, the laser weapon system would sense the

atmospheric conditions to the target, then using fast

steering mirrors, it would deform the main laser

beam as it leaves the weapon to use the atmosphere

to the target much like the lens of a pair of glasses

to refocus the beam on the target. Increasing laser

power and improving the beam quality can also help

to mitigate atmospheric effects in many cases.

Challenges remain in terms of the size, weight

and power input requirements of today’s laser sys-

tems, especially in the thermal control and power

management subsystems. But again, there are

major advances in these areas being made espe-

cially with the technology that has been developing

in the electric car industry.

When using laser weapons, the warfighters will

need new situational awareness and battle man-

agement tools because of the potential long-range

effects to avoid friendly systems fratricide. But again,

advances in computational power coming out of the

gaming industry (such as graphics processing units)

and artificial intelligence coming from autonomous

automobile development can be instrumental in

providing these needed capabilities.

While the development costs of directed energy

systems can be high, there are several factors in

play which can reduce these costs or at least pro-

vide better return on the investment over the life

cycle. For example, as mentioned earlier, directed

energy weapons development can take advantage of

progress being made in commercial industry around

processors, power generation and management and

even lasers subsystems themselves.

In addition, the “cost per shot” of a directed

energy weapons could be orders of magnitude less

expensive than current kinetic weapons. Consider

that today the United States will launch kinetic

interceptors at an incoming threat warhead that cost

tens of millions of dollars and multiple intercep-

tors are fired for maximum probability of success.

Compare that to a high energy laser which could kill

multiple threat missiles with a single “magazine”

charge for a tiny fraction of the cost. In addition,

while you are firing on one power source, you can be

charging another for near continuous operation.

More importantly, peer and near-peer nations

are developing these weapons at an alarming rate.

The United States must realize that it has to resource

the development and fielding of these capabilities.

The United States cannot allow itself to fall behind

in yet another area of warfighting as has happened

in hypersonics.

To maximize the United States’ ability to field

DE weapons, here is a ten-part approach to get us

going in the right direction:

1. Power Scaling and Improved Beam Quality.

DOD should significantly scale up laser power

and improve beam quality; as well as develop

higher power compact microwave weapons. The

pace of maturing these capabilities is not “tech-

nology limited;” it is “funding limited,” therefore

the United States should ensure that funding for

directed energy weapon development supports

the needed developments. Levels of $3 billion or

above per year should be maintained.

PRISM 8, NO. 3 FEATURES | 45

DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS

2. SWaP Reduction. The United States should

accelerate efforts to reduce the size, power input,

weight, and cost requirements of these weap-

ons. Since the most demanding size, weight and

power inputs requirements are in the missile

defense arena, MDA laser programs should be

fully funded to increase laser power levels for

high-altitude and space-based applications.

3. Warfighter Tactical Decision Aids. DOD

should provide warfighters with tactical deci-

sion aids to ensure they know how and when

to use these weapons. This will go far toward

instilling confidence in the warfighters that

these weapons will be effective in combat

against multiple threats. These aids would

include a guide to their effectiveness, similar to

what the Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual

does for kinetic weapons.

4. Lethality. The Office of the Secretary of

Defense should fund a program to focus

broadly on improving understanding of

microwave and laser weapon lethality. While

a tremendous amount of work has been done,

DOD should also conduct further research

to enhance understanding of laser and high-

power microwave lethality and reliability across

an increasing range of weather and atmospheric

conditions. This research should also focus on

minimizing any collateral damage.

5. Accelerated Acquisition. DOD should

accelerate acquisition of DE capabilities

using non-traditional practices. According to

Griffin, at the 9

Annual Defense Programs

Conference in March 2018, DOD takes an

estimated 16.5 years to bring new technologies

from statement of need to deployment. But

there are several examples where the timelines

have been dramatically shortened such as the

Navy’s Rapid Prototyping Experimentation

and Demonstration (RPED) program for

mission-critical capabilities and the use of

specialized acquisition authorities by the MDA.

DOD should use such accelerated processes for

DE development and deployment.

6. Long-term Commitment. DOD must signal

a long-term commitment to directed energy,

so the industrial base will know there will be a

market for its products in the coming years. In

doing so, DOD should prepare, and encourage,

the industrial base to support the rising need

for first-, second-, and third-tier suppliers.

7. Testing Infrastructure. DOD should provide

the needed testing infrastructure for directed

energy weapons especially as they can achieve

longer and longer ranges. This needs to include

rapid airspace deconfliction capabilities.

8. Increased Collaboration. All parties involved

in directed energy development should con-

tinue to talk to each other. Significant progress

has been made in communication and col-

laboration across the technical community

through their involvement in the Directed

Energy Professional Society (DEPS) and by the

HEL Joint Technology Office. DOD needs to

better articulate its requirements for deploy-

able lasers. But also, the industrial base must

interface better with DOD and its leadership

to increase understanding of innovative laser

weapon capabilities.

9. Training. DOD must also prioritize warfighter

training. There is currently no established

directed energy training pipeline; that is because

laser and microwave weapons have no formal

programs of record (PORs). Once the PORs are

set up, training must follow. To assist in estab-

lishing PORs, DOD should encourage wargames

and operational analysis to investigate and better

articulate the battlefield benefits of lasers.

10. Command and Control. DOD should adapt

command-and-control functions to address

46 | FEATURES PRISM 8, NO. 3

OBERING

rapidly evolving threats, such as hypersonics,

to reduce the engagement times of defensive

systems. Very short engagement timelines will

likely necessitate the incorporation of artifi-

cial intelligence capabilities to help the United

States leverage the speed-of-light engagement

that directed energy weapons offer.

These are steps to take to bring directed energy

prototype systems to the warfighters. The brave men

and women who confront dangerous threats across

all physical domains—land, air, sea, and space—

need nothing less than the world’s most promising

new capabilities to protect U.S. national security.

Adversaries are not waiting to develop directed

energy weapons. Neither should we. PRISM

Notes

Department of Defense Joint Publication 3-13.1,

Electronic Warfare (Washington, DC: Department of

Defense, 2012).

According to the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory,

The word “laser” is an acronym for light amplifica-

tion by stimulated emission of radiation. Laser light is

created when the electrons in atoms in special glasses,

crystals, or gases absorb energy from an electrical

current or another laser and become “excited.” The

excited electrons move from a lower-energy orbit to a

higher-energy orbit around the atom’s nucleus. When

they return to their normal or “ground” state, the elec-

trons emit photons (particles of light). These photons

are all at the same wavelength and are “coherent,”

meaning the crests and troughs of the light waves are

all in lockstep. In contrast, ordinary visible light com-

prises multiple wavelengths and is not coherent.

Additional information on “How Lasers Work,” is avail-

able on the Lawrence Livermore National Lab website,

<https://lasers.llnl.gov/education/how_lasers_work>.

“How a Fiber Laser Works,” SPI Lasers

International website, available at <https://www.spilasers.

com/industrial-fiber-lasers/how-fiber-lasers-work/>.

“Slab Lasers,” RP Photonics Encyclopedia website,

available at <https://www.rp-photonics.com/slab_lasers.

html>.

Ibid.

David Stoudt, Ph.D., Electrical Engineering, private

communication.

David M. Sowders et al., “High Power Microwave

(HPM) and Ultrawideband (UWB): A Primer on High

Power RF,” PL-TR-95-1111, Special Report, Phillips

Laboratory, March 1996, 76.

Ibid, 79.

Eileen Walling, “High Power Microwaves, Strategic

and Operational Implications for Warfare,” Occasional

Paper no. 11, Air War College Center for Strategy and

Technology, May 2000.

Department of Defense, The National Defense

Strategy 2018 (Washington D.C.: Office of the Secretary of

Defense, 2018).

Megan Eckstein, “Navy to Field High-Energy

Laser Weapon, Laser Dazzler on Ships This Year as

Development Continues,” USNI News, May 30, 2019.

Jen Judson, “U.S. Army Successfully Demos Laser

Weapon Stryker in Germany,” DefenseNews.com, March

21, 2018, available at < https://www.defensenews.com/

land/2018/03/21/us-army-successfully-demos-laser-weap-

on-on-stryker-in-europe/>.

Todd South, “Soldiers in Europe are now Using

Lasers to Shoot Down Drones,” ArmyTimes.com,

February 8, 2018, available at < https://www.armytimes.

com/news/your-army/2018/02/28/soldiers-in-europe-are-

now-using-lasers-to-shoot-down-drones/>.

Oriana Powlyk, “Raytheon Directed-Energy

Weapons Down Drones in Air Force Demonstration,”

Military.com, May 1, 2019, available at <https://www.

military.com/daily-news/2019/05/01/raytheon-direct-

ed-energy-weapons-down-drones-air-force-demonstra-

tion.html>.

Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Missile

Defense Review,” January 2019, available at < https://

www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Interactive/2018/11-

2019-Missile-Defense-Review/The%202019%20

MDR_Executive%20Summary.pdf>.

R. Jeffrey Smith, “Hypersonic Missiles Are

Unstoppable and They’re Starting a New Global Arms

Race,” New York Times Magazine, June 19, 2019.