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AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL - TECHNOLOGY
Directed-Energy Weapons
An Option for Strategic De- Escalation
Alfred CAnnin
A strategist should think in terms of paralyzing, not killing. . . . And on a still higher plane,
psychological pressure on the government of a country may suce to cancel all the resources
at its command—so that the sword drops from a paralyzed hand.
—B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach
E
merging technological advances have provided multiple nonlethal options
to deter, deny, and incapacitate threats posed by new adversaries and
changing strategic implications. Directed- energy- weapon (DEW) op-
tions demonstrate, via an escalation of force from nonlethal to lethal, a direct
targeting capability with a high likelihood of low collateral damage and reduced
risk of civilian casualties.
e Joint Intermediate Force Capabilities Oce, formerly the Joint Nonlethal
Weapons Directorate, is exploring the function and application of nonlethal
DEW defense technologies across the spectrum of conventional warfare and the
competition continuum. ese technologies will allow the US military to accom-
plish the mission while protecting friendly forces “without unnecessary destruc-
tion that initiates or prolongs expensive hostilities.”
1
Current binary decision-
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making solutions limit early nonlethal weapon- escalation possibilities across the
entire range of military options.
2
A Case for Directed- Energy Weapons
As the United States transitions from a well- developed understanding of ter-
rorism and violent extremism to focus on strategic competition, the US military
and coalition forces will encounter similar adversary tactics, techniques, and pro-
cedures. In both operational environments, proxy belligerents pursue their objec-
tives in irregular warfare battlespaces.
3
Terrorists and violent extremists conduct
embedded operations in populated areas to conceal intent, often seeking oppor-
tunities to create collateral damage (CD) and civilian casualties (CIVCAS).
4
As seen in recent operations, US forces have limited conventional weapons’
options against hostile actors comingling with noncombatants as these adversar-
ies seek to capitalize on US kinetic operations and CIVCAS reporting.
5
Violent
extremist organizations, with the presence of the world’s media, take advantage of
mistakes and collateral damage by promulgating narratives critical of US kinetic
CD and CIVCAS reporting, shaping an “us- or- them” local propaganda message
and shifting international opinion.
6
By portraying the United States as callous and indierent to the suering of
local populations, this eective guerrilla tactic creates vulnerabilities for the
United States and coalition forces. ese vulnerabilities are especially problematic
when the US military tries to balance oensive operations and self- defense with
strategy in conventional operations and across the continuum of strategic compe-
tition. Uncertainty about the true nature of civilian casualties in the battlespace
means a delay in identifying hostile acts or intent. Under the current rules of en-
gagement (ROE) in Phase III military operations and exacerbated by the inher-
ent compression of time and space, the rapid escalation of force necessitates a
preference for lethal conventional kinetic weapons.
7
Often as a result, the compre-
hensive analysis required to identify and prosecute a threat is limited.
Traditional conventional weapon escalation- of- force scenarios also limit sys-
tem 1 (fast thinking) and system 2 (slow thinking) cognitive problem analyses
used to determine hostile intent.
8
is analytic model is vital in determining hos-
tile intent and calculating associated responses across the full spectrum of military
options, from Phase 0 to Phase V and along gray- zone continuums. Moreover,
this calculus is made even more complex by the limitations on range capabilities,
complex targeting solutions, fog (actual and metaphorical), and the inescapable
friction of war.
9
Directed- energy weapons should be used in conjunction with conventional
weaponry to provide friendly forces with various escalations- of- force capabilities,
Directed Energy Weapons
AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2021 59
enabling the military to apply the minimum force required for a specic threat
versus a one- size- ts- all kinetic solution.
10
is new escalation-of-force opera-
tional concept (g. 1) complements conventional weapons with the sequential
and concurrent use of intermediate-force capabilities. Such an operational con-
cept provides the nonlethal and lethal DEW eects that Joint Force commanders
require while safeguarding US policy and strategy, limiting adversary retaliation
or escalation, and controlling battlespace information and perceptions.
e simplied targeting and speed- of- light characteristics of DEWs provide
an increased stando range for forces, allowing opportunities to prosecute hostile
threats early. With a new employment operational concept, DEW capabilities
expand the current kinetic escalation- of- force timeline, foster minimum-force
weapon applications, and increase safety for friendly forces.
Direct Energy Weapon Escalation of Force (EoF) Methodology
Time and Space Compression/Cognitive Capability/Experience/Training
NL-IFC
Deter
DEW
Disrupt
Non-Lethal HEL
Incapacitate
Lethal
HEL
Conventional
Weapons
Imminent Threat
Time
Inherent Right for Self-Defense
Threat Assessment
ROE Lethal Force Authorized
Threat to Friendly Forces
Figure 1. DEW escalation-of-force methodology
Nonlethal Directed- Energy Weapons
Bridging the gap between military presence and lethal intent, the Joint Inter-
mediate Force Capabilities Oce shapes the use of emerging nonlethal micro-
wave, millimeter, and laser- energy technologies in gray- zone operations, urban
areas, and irregular and unconventional warfare battleelds.
11
Nonlethal DEWs
are “developed and used with the intent to minimize the probability of producing
fatalities, signicant or permanent injuries, or undesired damage to material or
infrastructure.”
12
Nonlethal DEW technologies safeguard US forces against ne-
farious activities with capabilities including long- range, laser- induced plasma
audio devices that communicate US military presence, and nonlethal dispersal
and denial devices, which are silent and invisible to the human eye.
13
Additionally, silent, often nonattributable, nonlethal millimeter and microwave
devices exist to disorient personnel and disable, neutralize, and incapacitate enemy
electronic targets such as threat vehicles, vessels, and aircraft, with mitigation ben-
ets similar to those noted above for the escalation- of- force concept.
14
Nonlethal
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DEW options could better address a potential hostile act in uncertain bat-
tlespaces—urban—precluding an automatic, and possibly unnecessary, accelera-
tion to lethal-targeting options.
Lethal Directed- Energy Weapons
Lethal DEW, including high- energy lasers (HEL), complement nonlethal
DEW diuse capabilities in the escalation- of- force methodology, progressing
from nonlethal intermediate-force capabilities to material- kill targeting. ese
DEWs are “technologies that relate to the production of a beam of concentrated
electromagnetic energy or atomic or subatomic particles.”
15
ese technologies
are developed into weapons or systems “that use directed energy to incapacitate,
damage, or destroy enemy equipment, facilities, and/or personnel.”
16
Silent and invisible, high- energy laser systems used on countermaterial targets
can disable and destroy the mobility of positively identied personnel, minimiz-
ing conventional- weapon escalation and the secondary threat of collateral damage
and civilian casualties.
17
High- energy lasers are in the nascent stage of develop-
ment and not currently authorized. But as their power levels evolve, weapon-
quality lethal targeting options will emerge.
18
Advantages
Directed- energy weapon technologies oer a simplied aiming solution and
instantaneous targeting escalation from nonlethal intent to lethal force, resulting in
an elongated nonlethal weapons escalation- of- force window. If applied early, non-
lethal and lethal DEWs “in certain cases prevent the use of excessive force, escala-
tion in hostilities, and CD.”
19
Lethal DEW eects, highly discriminant and anti-
suering, oer a solution to minimize critical infrastructure or private property
collateral damage while still accomplishing military and political objectives. ese
weapons also remove the violent sensation and perception associated with conven-
tional kinetic weapons, avoiding third- order eects of adversary information-
operations propaganda and messaging that facilitates support and recruiting.
20
Over time, as the size, weight, power, and cooling levels of DEWs advance,
exible nonlethal and lethal DEWs are anticipated to proliferate across a diverse
range of security environments. ese capabilities could be employed more rou-
tinely than any other conventional weapon or emerging-weapons technologies.
21
The Right Tool
With various overlapping 5-Ds (deny, degrade, disrupt, deceive, or destroy)
properties, the preemptive escalation- of- force application of DEWs could resolve
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AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2021 61
malicious activities before conventional lethal force is required. e early applica-
tion of nonlethal weapons de- escalates ambiguous situations with minimum use
of force, safeguarding friendly forces while avoiding CD and CIVCAS. ese
weapons can be applied sequentially and concurrently during the escalation of
force to demonstrate resolve while avoiding damage caused by conventional ki-
netic (blast, fragmentation, cratering, incendiary, and penetration) weapons.
During confrontations where the ROE authorize lethal force, violence is not
always immediately suitable across the range of military options, particularly in
gray- zone operations where US policy and strategy limit military operations be-
low the threshold of armed conict. e civilian population- centered approach
facilitated by nonlethal DEWs retains the hearts and minds of those the United
States defends and helps gain the long- term trust and condence of future popu-
lations facing irregular and unconventional warfare in these unstable gray- zone
battlespaces of great power competition.
22
e scalability, silent, and often nonattributable nature, damage- level selec-
tions, and immediate responsiveness (speed of light) of DEW capabilities provide
friendly forces the means to target nuisance cominglers and direct threats with a
variety of tailored, minimum- force weapons.
23
Nonlethal and lethal DEW capa-
bilities also allow for engineered warfare scenarios. e combination of eects
could greatly inuence multiple wartime missions and result in less cause for the
enemy to retaliate or escalate force. With no clear evidence of US force and at-
tribution or signature- less employment by friendly forces, the United States can
engineer the de- escalation of a potential enemy threat.
Great power competition proxies deliberately operate below the threshold of
armed conict, rendering conventional kinetic weapons incompatible as they can
“adversely aect eorts to gain or maintain legitimacy and impede the attainment
of both short- term and long- term goals.”
24
e use of intermediate-force capa-
bilities, nonlethal DEWs, and the nonlethal application of HELs are particularly
advantageous in gray- zone scenarios “when restraints on friendly weaponry, tac-
tics, and levels of violence characterize the operational environment” across the
competition continuum.
25
Although the 2017 National Security Strategy, 2018 National Defense Strategy,
and 2021 Interim National Security Strategy have refocused the Department of
Defense toward strategic competition, the nature of warfare and our adversaries’
tactics, techniques, and procedures (to operate as a wolf in sheep’s clothing, ma-
neuvering to induce CD and CIVCAS events that can then be exploited to the
disadvantage of the United States) remain unchanged.
26
Military forces operate across the spectrum of conict zones, including military
operations other than war. During such noncombat operations, the authorized
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use of nonlethal DEWs early in an escalation- of- force methodology increases the
envelope of time available to identify and mitigate a threat. is capability pro-
vides Joint Force commanders the technological advantage to ensure friendly-
force safety with mission success across multiple spectrums.
Alternative Consideration
Implementing DEWs, individually and as a whole, will involve the expected
hurdle of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facili-
ties, and policy, and necessary bureaucracy. But DEWs will also face external
scrutiny. Some argue the premature, ultimately disappointing DEW technologies
in the Department of Defense are based not on results but instead on overesti-
mated technological capabilities and unrealistic timelines.
27
Others amplify this
warning, noting future budgetary constraints, challenges in adopting innovation,
and disconnects in implementation as the United States fails to capitalize on Ally
and partner relationships, particularly in DEW technologies.
28
e eects of public opinion on US decision makers are an unanticipated ob-
stacle to the implementation of existing DEWs. Highlighted by the US and inter-
national media, multiple human-rights activists and critics have raised two funda-
mental issues regarding DEW eects—safety concerns and ethics violations.
29
Culminating in 2010, controversy obscured the capabilities of the Active De-
nial System in Afghanistan.
30
Major media headlines hypersensationalized the
eects of active-denial-system weapons—in this case a microwave heat ray gun
dubbed Silent Guardian—as crippling and brutally painful, like “being exposed to
a blast furnace,” or “making people feel like they are on re.”
31
ese only partially
substantiated media spins resulted in the immediate removal of the Army active-
denial system weeks after its arrival but before its operational use—drastically
stunting the progress and momentum of DEW implementation.
32
e eectiveness of the media campaign directly conicts with the hypothesis
that nonlethal DEWs promote strategic benets and tactical prudence.
33
e ef-
fects of public opinion also highlight future requirements to purposely incorpo-
rate supportive narratives that encourage the adoption and implementation of
DEW, which include re- educating decision makers on past misunderstandings
and current capabilities.
Conclusion
New and old adversaries alike seek to exploit political perceptions regarding the
use of force. Changing US priorities have led to new challenges that modern
technologies and innovative tactics could address, providing Joint Force com-
Directed Energy Weapons
AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2021 63
manders the tools to achieve military objectives and ROE authorities to execute
minimum- force eects. Directed- energy weapons, including intermediate-force,
nonlethal, and lethal capabilities, present a complementary set of useful minimum-
force options as the US military continues to operate across multiple spectrums of
conict, especially in urban environments.
Updated escalation- of- force guidance in the form of ROEs that leverage
DEW capabilities early could enable Joint Force commanders to proactively
shape battleeld conditions and avoid unnecessarily raising the level of conict.
ese weapons could mitigate second- and third- order eects of irreversible US
kinetic weapon miscalculations, thus safeguarding US strategy and political ob-
jectives, limiting adversary retaliation, and shaping battlespace information, in-
uence, and perceptions in conventional operations and across the continuum of
strategic competition.
34
Additional research should aim to quantify if eects across multiple spectrums
of conict can oset conventional weapon incompatibilities, de- escalate battle-
eld scenarios, deter adversaries, and shape battlespace information, inuence,
and perceptions. Furthermore, research must address the current escalation- of-
force model, coercion, rst- use policies, and just war theory to validate benets for
an early escalation- of- force methodology. Moreover, a clearly articulated DEW
science and technological understanding, a cost- benet analysis, and the merging
of Joint Intermediate Force Capabilities Oce intermediate- force capability doc-
trine with HELs will encourage policy makers and DOD leadership to adopt and
implement these emerging DEW capabilities.
Alfred Cannin
Major Alfred Cannin, USAF, a winged aviator in USAF Special Operations Command, holds a master of aerospace
science from Embry- Riddle Aeronautical University.
Notes
1. Wendell B. Leimbach, interview with author, September 16, 2020.
2. Sjef Orbons, “Are Non- Lethal Weapons a Viable Military Option to Strengthen the Hearts
and Minds Approach in Afghanistan?” Defense & Security Analysis 28, no. 2 (2012): 114–30.
3. Department of Defense (DOD), Summary of the Irregular Warfare Annex to the National
Defense Strategy (Washington, DC: DOD, 2020).
4. Stephen D. Davis, “Controlled Warfare: How Directed- Energy Weapons Will Enable the
US Military to Fight Eectively in an Urban Environment While Minimizing Collateral Dam-
age,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 26, no. 1 ( January 2015): 49–71.
5. Davis, “Controlled Warfare,” 49−71.
6. Orbons, “Non- Lethal Weapons,” 127.
7. Orbons, “Non‐Lethal Weapons.”
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8. Paul K. Van Riper, “e Identication and Education of U.S. Army Strategic inkers,” in
Exploring Strategic inking: Insights to Assess, Develop, and Retain Army Strategic inkers, ed.
Heather M. K. Wolters, Anna P. Grome, and Ryan M. Hinds (Fort Belvoir, VA: US Army Re-
search Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, February 2013), 16–18, https://doi
.org/10.1037/e639722013-001; and Daniel Kahneman, inking, Fast and Slow (New York: Far-
rar, Straus and Giroux, 2011).
9. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Sta (CJCS), Joint Planning, Joint Publication ( JP) 5-0
(Washington, DC: CJCS, December 1, 2020), https://www.jcs.mil/; and Caleb Carr, ed., e Book
of War (New York: Modern Library, 2000).
10. CJCS, Peace Operations, JP 3-07.3, Incorporating Change 1 (Washington, DC: CJCS,
October 22, 2018), GL-4, https://www.jcs.mil/.
11. Orbons, “Non- Lethal Weapons.”
12. Ashton B. Carter, DoD Executive Agency for Non- Lethal Weapons (NLW), and NLW Policy,
DOD Directive 3000.03E, Incorporating Change 1 (Washington, DC: DOD, September 27,
2017), https://fas.org/.
13. Davis, “Controlled Warfare”; and Leimbach, interview with author.
14. Davis, “Controlled Warfare”; and Leimbach, interview with author.
15. DOD, DoD Dictionary, s.v. “directed energy,” accessed July 31, 2021, https://www.jcs.mil/.
16. DOD, DoD Dictionary, s.v. “directed energy weapon,” accessed July 31, 2021, https://www
.jcs.mil/
17. Davis, “Controlled Warfare.”
18. “Solid- State High- Energy Laser Systems,” Northrop Grumman (blog), November 9,
2020, https://www.northropgrumman.com/.
19. Davis, “Controlled Warfare,” 63.
20. Davis, “Controlled Warfare,” 49.
21. James N. Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of Amer-
ica: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: Oce of the Secretary
of Defense, January 2018), https://dod.defense.gov/; and Northrop Grumman, “Laser Systems.”
22. Orbons, “Non- Lethal Weapons.”
23. Joint Targeting School ( JTS), Joint Targeting School Student Guide (Dam Neck, Virginia:
JTS, March 1, 2017), https://www.jcs.mil/; Orbons, “Non‐lethal Weapons”; Davis, “Controlled
Warfare”; and Leimbach, interview with author.
24. Rudolph C. Barnes, “Military Legitimacy in OOTW: Civilians as Mission Priorities,”
Special Warfare 12, no. 4 (Fall 1999): 38–39.
25. CJCS, Joint Targeting, JP 3–60 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 2013), II–16.
26. Donald J. Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington,
DC: Executive Oce of the President, December 2017), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/;
and Mattis, National Defense Strategy.
27. Ash Rossiter, “High- Energy Laser Weapons: Overpromising Readiness,” Parameters 48,
no. 4 (Winter 2018−19): 33–44, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/; and John Gourville, “Eager
Sellers and Stony Buyers Understanding the Psychology of New- Product Adoption,” Harvard
Business Review ( June 2006), https://hbr.org/.
28. Rossiter, “High- Energy Laser”; and Hugh Beard, “View from the UK: Directed Energy as
a Next Generation Capability,” (address, Booz Allen Hamilton 2019 Directed Energy Summit,
n.d.), https://www.boozallen.com/.
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29. Sharon Weinberger, “US Military Heat- Ray: Set Phasers To . . . None,” BBC News,
November 18, 2014, https://www.bbc.com/.
30. Weinberger, “Military Heat- Ray.”
31. Tim Elfrink, “Safety and Ethics Worries Sidelined a ‘Heat Ray’ for Years. e Feds Asked
about Using It on Protesters,” Washington Post, September 17, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost
.com/; and John Hudson, “Raytheon Microwave Gun Recalled Amidst Controversy,” Atlantic,
July 19, 2010, https://www.theatlantic.com/.
32. Elfrink, “Safety and Ethics”; and Noah Shachtman, “Pain Ray Recalled,” Wired, July 20,
2018, https://www.wired.com/.
33. Schachtman, “Pain Ray Recalled”; and Orbons, “Non‐Lethal Weapons.”
34. JTS, Student Guide.
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