andlocalofcialschargedwithenforcement,potentiallyexposingthemtoextensive,expensive,and
time-consuming litigation and subjecting them to injunction.
WhetherCongressmayabrogatestatesovereignimmunitydependsontheconstitutionalbasis
on which it acts.
70
The EATS Act implicitly relies on Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution,
colloquially known as the Commerce Clause, for its authority. As the Supreme Court has ruled,
however, Congress may not use its authority under Article I to abrogate state sovereign immunity.
71
This
jurisprudence makes clear that Congress does not have the authority to subject states to suit from private
citizens under the Commerce Clause.
72
Accordingly, Section 3 of the EATS Act as applied to private
parties bringing suit directly against states themselves likely is unconstitutional.
There are caveats to state sovereign immunity doctrine, though. Principally, state immunity does
not extend to other sovereigns.
73
As a result, states are free to bring suit against one another for equitable
relief and damage awards.
74
The Federal Government also is free to bring such claims.
75
Moreover, Section 3 could expand liability exposure for state and
localofcials.AlthoughSection3doesnotspecicallymentionstateorlocal
ofcials,areviewingcourtmightinterpretitslanguagetoincludethemwithin
the private right of action in order to save the section from being found wholly
unconstitutional under the Eleventh Amendment. Under such an interpretation,
partiesmightbeabletosuepublicofcialsintheirofcialcapacitiestoenjoin
them from enforcing state law barred by the EATS Act.
76
Parties eligible to
bring suit potentially even could include private entities who would be unable
to sue the states themselves directly.
77
Inlawsuitsagainststateofcialsintheir
ofcialcapacities,however,onlyequitableremedies—notdamages—wouldbe
70. “A State may waive its sovereign immunity at its pleasure and in some circumstances Congress may abrogate it by appropriate legislation. But absent
waiverorvalidabrogation,federalcourtsmaynotentertainaprivateperson’ssuitagainstaState.”Id. at 253–54 (referencing College Savings Bank v.
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675–676 (1999)).
71. “Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete law-making authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional
authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting States. The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article
I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction.” Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72–73 (1996)
(overrulingtheCourt’spreviousconclusioninPennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,491U.S.1,19(1989),that“CongresshastheauthoritytooverrideStates’
immunity when legislating pursuant to the Commerce Clause”).
72. “WehaverecognizedthatCongressmayabrogateaState’simmunitywhenitactsunder§5oftheFourteenthAmendment,butnotwhenitactsunder
its original Article I authority to regulate commerce.” Virginia Off. for Prot. & Advoc. v. Stewart, 563 U.S. at 254 n.2 (citing Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,
517 U.S. at 59; 65–66).
73. “In ratifying the Constitution, the States consented to suits brought by other States or by the Federal Government.” Alden, 527 U.S. at 755 (citing
Principality of Monaco v. State of Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 328–29 (1934)).
74. “[T]he Constitution contemplates suits among the members of the federal system as an alternative to extralegal measures.” Alden, 527 U.S. at 755–56
(recognizingthat“thefearofprivatesuitsagainstnonconsentingStateswasthecentralreasongivenbytheFounderswhochosetopreservetheStates’
sovereign immunity”).
75. “A suit which is commenced and prosecuted against a State in the name of the United States by those who are entrusted with the constitutional duty to
‘takeCarethattheLawsbefaithfullyexecuted,’U.S.Const.,Art.II,§3,differsinkindfromthesuitofanindividual...SuitsbroughtbytheUnitedStates
itself require the exercise of political responsibility for each suit prosecuted against a State, a control which is absent from a broad delegation to private
persons to sue nonconsenting States.” Alden, 527 U.S. at 755–56.
76. See Alden,527U.S.at756(“[S]overeignimmunity[doesnot]barallsuitsagainststateofcers,”but“[s]omesuitsagainststateofcersarebarredby
the rule that sovereign immunity is not limited to suits which name the State as a party if the suits are, in fact, against the State.”). Legislators likely are
immune from suit, as the Supreme Court has “recognized that state legislators enjoy common-law immunity from liability for their legislative acts, an
immunity that is similar in origin and rationale to that accorded Congressmen under the Speech or Debate Clause.” Supreme Ct. of Virginia v. Consumers
Union of U. S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 732 (1980) (citing Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951)).
77. “[W]henafederalcourtcommandsastateofcialtodonothingmorethanrefrainfromviolatingfederallaw,[thatofcial]isnottheStateforsovereign-
immunitypurposes.Thedoctrineislimitedtothatprecisesituation,anddoesnotapply‘whenthestateisthereal,substantialpartyininterest.’”Virginia
Off. for Prot. & Advoc. v. Stewart, 563 U.S. at 255 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 (1984) (internal quotation
omitted))(discussingthestateofcialexceptiontothesovereignimmunitydoctrineestablishedinExparteYoung,209U.S.123(1908)).
Under such an
interpretation, parties
might be able to sue public
officials in their official
capacities to enjoin them
from enforcing state law
barred by the EATS Act.
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATION
33
Legislative Analysis of S.2019 / H.R.4417: The “Ending Agricultural Trade Suppression Act”